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Abstract 
Universities have traditionally been key players in producing and validating new scientific 
knowledge, but other actors have also become major research performers. Meanwhile, the 
notion of research has been extended considerably, and the environment of universities is also 
undergoing fundamental changes. Thus, it is timely to consider alternative futures for them, to 
be better prepared for their new roles. A review of recent works on the future of higher 
education shows that the starting point in these exercises is either an existing or an abstract 
university. This approach has three major shortcomings: (i) the broader socio-economic 
systems, in which universities operate, are not addressed in these analyses, and thus neither 
the potential changes in these broader settings, nor their impacts on higher education can be 
explored; (ii) the huge diversity of higher education systems and individual universities 
cannot be reflected; (iii) the role of other research actors, and more importantly, the links 
among universities and those other research players are often disregarded. 
This article offers an alternative approach, using the case of EU universities as an example, to 
rectify these shortcomings. A set of ‘cascading’ visions are devised to demonstrate the close 
links between three levels. First, alternative futures are developed for the EU by considering 
(i) the overall rationale of EU policies; and (ii) the standing of the EU vis-à-vis the Triad. 
Second, the different directions are identified, in which the European Research and 
Innovation Area can evolve. Third, skipping the national level, futures are built for the 
universities themselves, focussing on their research activities. 
The modest intention of the futures presented in this paper is to demonstrate how to use the 
proposed new approach, and initiate meaningful and lively dialogues among stakeholders. 
Their diverse accumulated knowledge and experience, as well as distinct viewpoints are 
indispensable for building policy-relevant visions. The proposed three-level structure of 
futures – or ‘cascading’ visions – offer several advantages for policy-makers at various levels, 
the stakeholders of universities, as well as academics interested in prospective analysis of 
innovation systems. 
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1 Introduction* 
The first universities emerged as “responses to the need to harness the expanding intellectual 
forces of the era to the increasingly demanding knowledge requirements of the surrounding 
society and economy” in the 12th to 15th century in Europe – as this major institutional 
innovation is described by P.A. David, “masked in the language of our contemporary 
discussions of university research and training policies” [1, pp. 3-4]. Although there might be 
some heated disputes among various observers if universities are still largely ‘medieval 
organisations’1 or have undergone a series of major changes in the last 700-800 years, there 
appears to be a strong consensus on the need for a new round of fundamental reforms from all 
corners: policy-makers, analysts, and universities themselves (see, e.g. [2-8]). The reasons for 
that are manifold – and becoming almost commonplaces, thanks to the richness of literature 
and the number of projects and workshops analysing the future of universities: globalisation 
of the economy and research; emergence of new research players; changing science-society 
links and societal demands towards universities; demographic changes, ‘massification’ of 
higher education, and student ‘consumerism’; technological development (offering new 
opportunities, and in the meantime putting extra burdens on the already tight budgets of 
universities); tensions in the national/ regional budgets financing higher educations, and the 
concomitant requirements of the so-called new public management (accountability, 
transparency, efficiency and effectiveness, responsiveness, as well as forward looking); and 
finally the new methods, approaches and norms to organise, manage, validate, legitimate and 
evaluate research activities. 
Given the complexity of these factors, it is of crucial importance to underpin the proposed 
new round of reforms by thorough and systematic prospective analyses, e.g. by developing 
‘futures’ (‘visions’ or ‘scenarios’).2 Yet, a number of important – and potentially influential – 
proposals or policy documents do not discuss the future at all [2, 6], while other documents 
only discuss a single vision, i.e. do not consider alternative futures; a striking example of that 
approach is the recent EU Green Paper on the European Research Area [3]. 
Georghiou and Cassingena Harper [9] have reviewed recent works on the future of higher 
education, and found extensive discussion and study of this topic, but limited instances of 
clearly documented FTA3 activities (p. 2). Although the ‘sponsors’ of the reviewed exercises 
range from a single university to international organisations (the EU, OECD and UNESCO), 
in all these cases the starting point – the ‘unit of analysis’ – is either an existing or an abstract 
(hypothetical) university. This approach has major shortcomings, as three important fact(or)s 
cannot be considered in these exercises. First, universities – like all the other research players 
– operate in broader socio-economic systems, and thus it is crucial to set the scene, when 
devising futures for them. Yet, the likely impacts of potential changes in these broader 
systems are not analysed at all in the reviewed FTA activities. Second, a huge diversity can be 
observed among continents (note the differences among the “broad models” of higher 
education e.g. in the US, Asia and Europe), across countries on the same continent, and even 
                                                 
* This article draws on a report prepared for an expert group on The Future of Key Research Actors in the 
European Research Area, commissioned by DG Research, EC. Comments on earlier versions by Andrea 
Bonaccorsi, Elie Faroult, János Gács, Luke Georghiou, Annamária Inzelt, and the editors of this special issue are 
gratefully acknowledged. 
1 See, e.g. the harsh critique by a former British minister of Education and Skills published in The Guardian on 
10 May 2003, cited in [1, p.4]. 
2 These terms are often used as interchangeable ones in the literature – a simple, pragmatic distinction among 
them is offered in Section 4. 
3 FTA stands for Future-oriented Technology Analysis, one of the terms to denote systematic prospective 
analysis. 
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inside countries concerning the performance, funding and governance models of their higher 
education organisations, as well as their efficiency (whatever metrics is used). When a 
particular or an ‘abstract’ university is taken as a unit of analysis, this diversity simply cannot 
be reflected. Third, the role of other research actors, and more importantly, the links among 
universities and those other research players are often disregarded. 
This article offers an alternative approach, using the case of EU universities as an example, to 
rectify these shortcomings. As the above list of factors that shape the future of universities 
reveals, a number of trends or challenges are international in their very nature, while the legal 
competences to set policies are with the national or (sub-national) regional governments. The 
European Commission has launched several initiatives to align these regional and national 
policies, so as to join forces when facing these challenges and thus find (and fund) more 
appropriate answers.4 Moreover, the EU itself is still evolving; in part due to a number of 
internal factors – e.g. the recently initiated strategic processes and enlargement are the most 
visible ones –, and in part as a reaction to external factors, such as globalisation, competition 
among the Triad regions, etc. The strategic responses of the EU would also determine the 
range and ‘relative weight’ of stakeholders to be involved in a participatory prospective 
analysis on the future of universities: the role of university staff, students and the civil society 
at large, policy-makers or businesses might differ significantly in distinct ‘futures’ for the EU. 
Hence, the starting point here is the EU, as the broadest socio-economic context for 
universities, with its own science, technology and innovation (STI) policy tools, and to some 
extent influencing the rationales of regional and national STI policies, all affecting the 
activities of universities. It is followed by futures for the European Research and Innovation 
Area (ERIA),5 as the more immediate surroundings for universities, and also the framework in 
which they co-operate and compete with other research actors active inside the EU.6 Finally, 
futures are devised for universities. 
This is a sort of ‘top-down’ approach, and hence a number of ‘micro-level’ factors might be 
missing, but those can be added during an actual foresight process.7 In any case, this article 
does not report on the results of an actual foresight process on universities: it is a proposal to 
apply the foresight toolkit in this field by following a new approach. The futures developed 
here are just to demonstrate how to use this proposed methods, and its potential benefits for 
various stakeholders. 
                                                 
4 The most visible ones are the so-called Bologna process, the regular meetings of education ministers, as well as 
the other channels of the so-called “open method of co-ordination”. The Spring European Council meetings, 
assessing the progress towards the Lisbon strategy, using several indicators on HE performance, can also 
influence national and regional HE policies. Also indirectly – and less manifestly – the various EC funded 
projects and expert groups on higher education can also shape these policies. 
5 ERIA is understood throughout this paper as the set of all relevant actors of RTDI processes in the EU, as well 
as their interactions. In other words, ‘ERIA-policies’ of the EU are just one element of ERIA, as it is composed 
of all other EU, national and regional policies affecting RTDI processes and performance, the activities of firms, 
various types of R&D units and institutes, higher education organisations, financial intermediaries, as well as a 
host of supporting, bridging and service organisations, and most importantly the systemic features, i.e. the 
interactions (competition, communication, networking, co-operation, etc.) among these actors. 
6 Non-EU universities and business R&D units are already operating in the EU, and given the intense 
internationalisation of research and innovation activities, their presence is likely to be more pronounced. 
7 Foresight processes (programmes, projects, exercises) are part of the broader ‘family’ of prospective analysis or 
FTA activities. They have three distinguishing features: they consider alternative futures (as opposed to e.g. 
forecasting exercises); they are action-oriented (unlike e.g. academic papers in the tradition of futures studies); 
and participatory, that is, they involve the representatives of relevant stakeholders, disseminate their results 
among the wider public affected by the changes/ actions in the field/ theme analysed, and seek feedback from 
this wider community when finalising their reports, policy recommendations, etc. 
3 
From a different angle, there are fundamental differences between foresight programmes, on 
the one hand, and future-oriented academic or consultancy projects, on the other. The very 
idea behind participatory programmes is to bring together different stakeholders with their 
diverse sets of accumulated knowledge and experience, as well as distinct viewpoints and 
approaches so as to enrich the discussion and analysis. Further, the shared visions and policy 
recommendations, stemming from the dialogue among participants, offer a basis for faster and 
more efficient implementation. In contrast, futures developed by individuals can only 
experiment with new methods, or spark dialogues, by offering food for thought, at best. 
The theoretical framework of this article rests on the innovation systems school [10-15]), and 
especially its emphasis on the importance of academia-industry co-operation [16, 17]). The 
remainder is organised as follows. First, the current and emerging roles of universities are 
analysed (Section 2), followed by an account of key trends and the drivers for changes 
(Section 3). Then, in Section 4 alternative visions are devised at three levels, with the time 
horizon of 2020-2025. At the first level the overall rationale of EU policies, and its standing 
vis-à-vis the Triad regions are considered as major ‘variables’ of the alternative futures for the 
EU. At the second, it is assumed that the European Research and Innovation Area can evolve 
in different directions, depending on the main features of the EU to a significant extent, but 
obviously having its own dynamics, too.8 Finally, at the third level, the diversity of 
universities can be explored by devising futures for different ideal types of universities, taking 
into account the relevant ERIA visions. In other words, this third level, itself, is consisted of a 
set of futures. Finally, methodological and policy conclusions are drawn. 
A few remarks are in order to indicate the limitations of this paper. As it is aimed at a 
prospective analysis, it does not offer an exhaustive academic treatment of the current 
situation of universities.9 Further, to reduce complexity, the futures devised for universities 
(Section 4) only consider their research activities. No doubt, it is a somewhat artificial 
‘partitioning’, but the main purpose of this paper to experiment with the proposed 3-level 
structure for building futures, rather than to offer fully-fledged visions, covering all aspects. If 
this approach proves to be useful, the aspects of education activities can easily be added.10 
 
 
                                                 
8 Several ERA visions have been devised by putting governance issues into the centre, see e.g. [18-20] – the ones 
developed in this paper follow a different logic. 
9 The term ‘universities’ is used as shorthand for all sorts of higher education organisations. 
10 The first attempt to do so can be found in a previous report [21]. 
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2 The role of universities in knowledge production 
2.1 The changing landscape of research systems 
Universities have traditionally been key players in producing and validating new scientific 
knowledge.11 From the point of view of R&D and innovation (RTDI) processes, they have 
focussed on two main activities:  
 training the future generation of researchers, engineers, managers (including R&D 
managers), experts, and policy-makers (among many other fields, for STI policies);12 
 conducting various types of research.13 
Academies emerged in some countries as early as the end of the 16th century [1, pp. 5-6], 
while further research actors became strong players in the 19th century, notably firms (often – 
but not exclusively – in the form of R&D units) and public labs [12]. More recently, some 
patient groups and other types of NGOs are also engaged in research activities. The role of 
users in the innovation process is also recognised now, and become much better understood 
[26]. Moreover, the notion of research has been extended/ revised considerably, and the 
discussion moved on to analyse broader issues, like knowledge (types and sources of 
knowledge), knowledge production and use, new players in producing, using and validating 
knowledge, learning, learning capabilities, and learning systems, etc. [13, 14, 27-30]. 
Notwithstanding the above general considerations on the principal role of universities in 
creating knowledge, one should not overlook the significant diversity across the EU at least in 
three aspects: 
 the balance of research activities between universities and other players; 
 the competence of national vs. regional governments to regulate and fund universities; 
 the outputs (outcomes, impacts) of research efforts by universities. 
Only the first aspect is treated in some detail below. As for the second one, suffice it to say 
that in some bigger EU countries – e.g. in Germany and the UK – the regional authorities 
have competences to devise policies on higher education, as well as to fund higher education 
organisations.14 
                                                 
11 The role of inventors is not to be discussed here, although they have advanced technologies to a very 
significant extent, and several major inventions have long preceded the proper theories of their underpinning 
scientific principles, such as the steam engine, the first airplanes, semiconductors, etc. In other words, the links 
between science and technology are far from being (uni-)linear. Contrary to the widespread belief that 
technologies are, in essence, applied sciences, a number of scientific disciplines evolved from the puzzles why 
certain technologies work as they do. [22] 
12 This list is far from being exhaustive: to keep it short, many professionals are not mentioned here, whose 
activities are also of crucial importance for successful RTDI activities, either directly (e.g. legal, financial, and 
marketing experts) or indirectly (e.g. teachers). 
13 A number of typologies could be used to define/ classify research activities, e.g. the ones developed by [23- 
25]. For a proper policy dialogue it is crucial to use appropriate terms, but it would go beyond the scope of this 
paper to discuss these competing terminologies in detail. Suffice it to say that the still pre-dominant ‘holy trinity’ 
of “basic and applied research, plus experimental development” is not providing any meaningful guidance for 
devising policies, and can be even seriously misleading. It is also obvious that (i) not only universities conduct 
academic research (see Section 2.2. on the role of other research actors); and (ii) university research and basic 
research should not be taken as synonyms. 
14 Clearly, the significant differences in the responsibilities of national and regional governments in funding and 
regulating higher education have to be taken into account when formulating policy recommendations or actual 
policy decisions. Yet, it is simply not possible to reflect on this diversity in a single paper. For a more detailed 
discussion, see, e.g. [31]. 
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As for the third aspect, the very fact that universities’ research efforts lead to rather diverse 
outputs (outcomes, impacts), both in terms of quality and quantity, prevents any meaningful 
analysis at the EU level. The sheer number of universities, together with the diversity in their 
performance, implies that a thorough, micro level discussion would be needed, and on that 
basis comparative analyses can be conducted either at regional/ national level, or across 
countries, but then taking only universities belonging to the same ‘league’, e.g. those aspiring 
world-class research and education, or those who cater for the regional needs. Further, 
empirical research does suggest that diversity prevails even inside universities: the 
performance of faculties or individual institutes/ departments varies a lot. No doubt, there are 
various efforts to rank universities in spite of these methodological difficulties, but none of 
these ‘league tables’ is generally accepted.15 
 
2.2 Where research is located: universities vs. other players 
There is a rather strong consensus in the literature on the rationale to spend public money on 
basic science: training of future generations of researchers is understood to have overriding 
importance among the other benefits of basic science, implicitly assumed to be conducted 
(almost exclusively) at universities [33-35]. From a different angle, this consensus suggests a 
very close link between higher education and research. Indeed, for centuries universities had 
been elite education institutes for the elite in two respects: (i) only the elite of a given age 
cohort was offered higher education;16 and (ii) the ‘output’ was the next generation of the 
elite: higher education meant to reproduce academic staff and societal leadership. It was 
important, therefore, to offer the highest possible level of education, which, in turn, required 
high quality research. To further strengthen the link between education and research, when 
training the next generation of the academic staff it was a must to teach them how to conduct 
research, too, i.e. to involve them in research activities while they were students. In short, that 
was the Humboldtian model of universities: assuming a unity of teaching and research, based 
on the idea of higher education through exposure to, and immersion in, research activities 
[36]. 
The last few decades, however, saw a major change: with 30-48% of the relevant age cohort 
attending tertiary education in most OECD countries, we cannot speak of the same ‘higher’ 
education (HE) system. It is neither exclusively the ‘elite’, who participates in it, and nor the 
only aim is to reproduce the academic and societal elite.17 Thus, an increasing number of HE 
institutes are mainly – or only – teaching organisations, and overall we can see, therefore, a 
growing number of ‘teaching-only’ positions in the HE sector. In the meantime, the number 
of ‘research-only’ positions is also increasing at certain universities, plus other research 
performers do play a major role in producing knowledge. In other words, teaching and 
research nowadays are only ‘intertwined’ at a fewer number of universities, and usually only 
                                                 
15 Obviously, it would be pertinent to conduct thorough empirical analyses to compare the performance of 
universities among the Triad regions, as well as across EU countries, by taking into account the ‘quality’ and 
‘efficiency’ of their research and education activities. First, though, a sound methodology should be developed to 
establish appropriate metrics and evaluation criteria. A recent, major attempt to analyse the performance of EU 
universities is [32]. 
16 The term itself – higher education – clearly reflects this feature. Nowadays, however, we tend not to pay 
attention to the contradiction between the level of quality what this very name would imply and the 
repercussions of the ‘massification’ of the ‘third level’ education. 
17 Just to illustrate this with the example of the UK in the mid-1990s: “Today one in three young people go to 
university, a proportion which is continuing to rise. Where it was once thought exceptional to win a place at 
university, was a guaranteed sign of academic and social advance and a just occasion for celebration, today it 
merely marks a stage in life, requiring no special academic merit, signalling in itself no great likelihood of later 
worldly success.” [37] 
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at the post-graduate level. The Humboldtian model has thus become an exception, rather than 
the rule. 
The average share of universities in performing basic research was 54% across the OECD in 
2003, but individual country figures varied in the range of 28-76% [Table 2 in 5]. Thus, 
universities do play a leading role in a number of countries, while public labs have a non-
negligible weight in several other countries.18 Thus, the role of these latter types of research 
organisations should not be ignored in policy discussions.19 
In sum, there are two reasons to revisit the aforementioned, widely held, consensus on the 
rationale for funding ‘basic’ science by public money: (i) the very notion of ‘basic’ science is 
questionable, (ii) even if we continue using this doubtful term, higher education and ‘basic’ 
science are not that closely interconnected nowadays as they used to be, partly because of the 
changing nature of higher education, and partly because the crucial role of other research 
actors in producing knowledge. 
To understand the role of universities, it is worth summarising some basic ‘stylised’ facts of 
the overall research landscape.20 First, a huge variety can be observed among the EU (and 
OECD) members both in terms of their ‘pool’ of researchers, i.e. their absolute numbers, and 
‘research-intensity’ of employment, i.e. the number of researchers per 1000 labour force. 
Second, both employment and financial data, that is, spending on R&D activities by research 
performing sectors, suggest a great diversity in terms of the ‘weight’ of these sectors. Yet, a 
clear finding is that the business enterprise sector is a dominant one in the majority of OECD 
(and EU) countries, and all the advanced ones share this feature. From a different angle: the 
relative weight of higher education, and especially that of the government sector, is higher in 
the less developed countries. (Figures 1-2) Third, output indicators, such as publications, 
citations, patents awarded, spin-off firms established, etc. are not readily available by research 
performing sectors, and thus their relative weight cannot be compared this way. 
 
Figures 1-2 to be inserted here 
 
 
                                                 
18 The well-known examples are the institutes belonging to Max Planck Gesellschaft (Germany), CNRS (Centre 
National de la Recherche Scientifique, France), CNR (Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche, Italy), CSIC (Consejo 
Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, Spain), Ludwig Boltzmann Gesellschaft (Austria), and the Academies of 
Sciences in a number of Central and eastern European countries. 
19 For a more detailed description of public research centres, especially on the variety of players in this sector, 
e.g. in terms of organisational forms and changing ownership (public, semi-public) profiles, missions, size, and 
performance, see [38], pp. 65-74. The report also signals a similar warning: “Relatively speaking, this sector has 
received less attention than the business and higher education sectors. One barrier to understanding is the wide 
range of structures existing in Europe, which vary by country, nature of mission and type of research. 
Furthermore, this sector is often less visible in public indicators (such as the number of scientific publications 
and patents) because the principal outputs of its scientific and technological activities are consumed by 
government itself in terms of advice, or by private clients for technological consultancy.” (ibid, p. 65) 
20 Space limits prevent presenting data here; an extensive statistical annex can be found in the original report for 
the DG Research, EC, on which this article draws. This section, in turn, relies on OECD data, published in [39]. 
A detailed analysis of some recent trends in universities’ research activities can be found in [5]. 
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3 Recent key trends and driving forces for future changes 
Several recent key trends, as well as driving forces can be identified that are likely to 
influence universities’ research activities, and thus will be used to underpin the futures for 
universities, presented in Section 4.21 The order, in which they are listed below, does not 
reflect their significance. 
The most important recent key trends concern the roles/ responsibilities of universities. First, 
the balance of various roles – teaching; academic research; joint RTDI projects with 
businesses (including trouble-shooting); consultancy for NGOs and policy-makers at national/ 
regional/ local levels – is changing. Second, new roles are emerging, e.g. universities are 
assuming essential responsibilities in shaping local, regional, sectoral, national and 
international production and innovation systems.22 
The most important driving forces can be derived by considering the increasingly intense 
global competition in research activities; technological, financial and societal factors; and the 
changing rules to govern research. 
There is an ever more intense quest for excellence in research in order to improve academic 
recognition and thus being able to raise funds, either from public or private sources, as well as 
for speedier completion of projects: new results should be achieved faster to stay ahead of 
rival research groups. This is adding thrust to the already strong pressure for intense 
international collaboration, and in the meantime a fierce competition for talents (PhD students 
and researchers) among universities, as well as between universities and other research actors. 
New players are likely to enter the global research arena in two respects. First, a large number 
of research organisations (universities, public and private labs, firms, etc.) located in currently 
laggard countries are likely emerge as major players. In other words, the number of the 
already existing types of research organisations can increase significantly, hence adding to the 
intensity of global competition, and given their specific feature, to a somewhat limited extent 
adding to the diversity of the ‘ecology’ of research actors, too. Second, new types of – 
currently ‘unthinkable’ – research players might also evolve,23 and that could change the 
‘ecology’ quite radically, e.g. in terms of more pronounced variety, as well as new 
opportunities and rules for co-operation and competition. As a result of selection, not only 
certain research actors, but even types of research actors might disappear, as they are 
becoming ‘unfit’ to the radically changing environment. 
Technological changes offer more sophisticated and thus more expensive equipment for 
conducting research, but in the meantime it also becomes a must to purchase these pieces of 
advanced equipment, given the intense international rivalry among research actors. That is 
putting extra burdens on the already tight budgets of research organisations, including 
universities. 
                                                 
21 Other key trends and drivers for change, affecting the education activities at universities are discussed, e.g. in 
[2-3, 7-9, 21, 28-30, 36, 40-41]. This section also draws on these sources, as well as the findings presented at 
workshops organised by EC JRC IPTS on the Future of European University. 
22 A further recent key trend is triggered by the so-called Bologna Process. Its original goals are of direct 
relevance for the teaching role of universities, i.e. not directly for their role played in the research arena. At the 
Berlin Conference, held on 18-19 September 2003, however, the need to incorporate doctoral studies into the 
Bologna Process was specifically mentioned [41], and that dimension is obviously closely interconnected with 
the research activities of universities, both in terms of the present research projects (in which PhD students are 
usually participating), and as the training of the future generation of researchers. 
23 A few decades ago no one would have thought of e.g. NGOs and patient groups as research players. 
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Tighter funding opportunities lead to increased competition among higher education and other 
public research organisations for restricted funds. 
Cost-efficiency of research becomes a major objective: the combined effects of technological 
changes, together with the pressure on public funding, open a gap between rapidly increasing 
research costs and public budgets allocated to research conducted at universities. Thus 
research projects are to be closely scrutinised in terms of their cost-efficiency, too. 
New methods, approaches, and norms are likely to be applied when organising, managing, 
validating, legitimating, and evaluating research activities. 
Regional, national or supra-national policies can toughen some of the above driving forces, 
slow down or divert their impacts, or create new drivers for change by introducing far-
reaching and resolute goals for research. A prime example of a potential major impact of 
public policies is the current initiative in several countries to ‘strongly encourage’ universities 
to patent their research results, following the Bayh-Dole Act of the US.24 
These S&T, societal and economic factors – coupled with various policies and regulations – 
may give rise to a number of future trends, some of which are briefly summarised below. 
1. Intensifying international mobility of post-graduate students and researchers 
Currently, post-graduate courses offered by US universities are particularly attractive for 
foreign students, including those from the EU. Nearly 60% of science and engineering 
doctoral students coming from EU countries have firm plans to stay in the US upon the 
completion of their studies, instead of returning to the EU. This proportion has risen 
notably over the past decade: from 44.5 % at the beginning of the 1990s to 57.5 % at the 
turn of the millennium. ([43], p. 57) 
Competition for talents – both intra-EU, and globally – is likely not merely to continue, 
but intensify significantly. 
2. Increasingly stronger international co-operation in research (and innovation) projects at a 
global level and an EU-level, as none of the Triad regions – let alone individual countries 
– can be self-sufficient 
A possible backlash against globalisation can slow down this trend, however, given a 
growing scepticism among the population regarding internationalisation [4]. It can be fed 
by fears of terror attacks and wars, concerns about the increasing immigration, loss of 
national identity and pride. That might lead to a much larger share of research classified 
by governments as military R&D. 
3. Stronger, better articulated needs for multi- (trans-; inter-)disciplinary research 
4. New players might emerge and new norms might be applied when legitimating and 
validating knowledge 
Besides conventional academic researchers, knowledge is produced by a wide variety of 
players, e.g. think tanks, private research organisations, non-profit organisations, 
government agencies, consultancy companies, market research organisations, patients’ 
groups, various NGOs, trade associations, interest groups. These pieces of knowledge are 
used by some of these organisations themselves (government agencies, firms’ labs), sold 
to other parties (contract research organisations, consultancies) or exploited in political/ 
                                                 
24 These policy initiatives are heavily criticised by researchers on various grounds. In brief, too much emphasis 
on ‘forcing’ appropriability of publicly financed research is likely (a) to slow down the rate of knowledge 
generation; (b) might also distort the direction of search by closing promising avenues and/ or decreasing variety 
in research; and (c) can hamper innovation efforts of firms; see, e.g. [1, 22, and 42]. 
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societal processes for advocating/ pursuing certain views or interests (NGOs, trade 
associations). From a different angle, these pieces of knowledge are also diffused, and 
thus subjects to different types of validation procedures (formal/ informal; explicit/ 
implicit). Currently the rules of validation seem to be in flux, i.e. the traditional peer-
review process seems to lose its long-established monopoly. As the roles of different 
players, and hence ‘the rules of the game’ are changing in legitimating knowledge, 
different possible future states can be considered: (a) non-academic sources of knowledge 
are considered fully legitimate, i.e. academic research loses its power to validate 
knowledge; (b) knowledge – either from academic or non-academic sources – is only 
accepted in society if validated by conventional academic rules and players; (c) a clear 
separation between knowledge created by credible academic organisations and non-
academic ones, the former enjoying a higher status. [28] 
5. Changing set of evaluation criteria 
Depending on the speed and extent of changes envisaged above, especially (1)-(3), 
universities are likely to be evaluated by using new metrics, besides the conventional 
criteria of academic excellence (notably publications, citations). In particular: to what 
extent do they fulfil their various societal roles; what types of courses are offered to 
whom, at what level of quality; are they attractive for foreign staff and students; are they 
active in international co-operation; to what extent are they engaged in multi- (trans-; 
inter-) disciplinary training and research; are they using various resources in an efficient 
way? 
Various types of universities (e.g. ones focussing on vocational training as opposed to 
post-graduate teaching and research; or meeting local needs vs. acting as a global player; 
etc.) are likely to be evaluated by different sets of criteria. 
The overall rationale of ERIA, in which EU universities operate, is also likely to have an 
impact on devising evaluation criteria and methods. (See Section 4.1 on different possible 
rationales for ERIA.) 
6. Further proliferation of the already existing diversity of governance and management 
models, and more pronounced professionalisation of university management 
There is already a wide variety of governance models (different ways and weights of 
involving stakeholders: national and regional policy-makers, businesses, societal groups, 
students, academic staff, etc.) as well as management models (collegial vs. professional, 
and their different ‘blends’). [36] The inherent tension between the interests, values, and 
goals of different stakeholders, as well as the one between the need to monitor and control 
the various activities of universities for managerial purposes and the nature of academic 
activities would most likely be resolved in different ways by different players. The 
emergence of new players – and new business models for universities – is likely to add 
‘more colours’ to this picture. The diversity of governance and management models, 
therefore, is likely to further proliferate, even inside the group of similar universities, let 
alone among different types of them. 
 
 
4 Futures for universities 
Vision-building requires an intense dialogue among stakeholders for two reasons: (i) different 
approaches/ perspective need to be taken into account when contemplating about the future; 
(ii) the links, communication, interactions, co-operations among the various players are key 
aspects of the future shape and performance of universities. The ideas presented here, 
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therefore, can only be taken as points of departure for two types of activities. First, they are 
aimed at triggering a debate among experts on the relevance of the proposed method, that is, 
the 3-level structure for devising futures. Second, the content – or some elements – of the 
futures drafted here can be used as one of the inputs for dialogues among stakeholders in 
actual foresight processes. 
An actual foresight process, in turn, might have many different outcomes. Following the usual 
distinction in the literature, we can think of ‘process benefits’ and ‘products’. The first would 
include more intense, regular communication among the stakeholders even when the process 
is completed; stronger co-operation; shared visions and consensus on the actions need to be 
taken; commitment to act upon the recommendations emerging from the process. The second 
refers to lists of priorities and proposed actions (for different stakeholders, in this case e.g. 
university rectors and deans, regional, national and EU policy-makers, businesses and local 
communities as partners of universities), inputs for strategic planning (again, at different 
levels). The type of intended outcomes always depends on the design (objectives) of a 
foresight programme, i.e. if it is mainly a process-oriented exercise, a product-oriented one, or 
a mixed approach is taken. The use of the recommendations – e.g. strategy formation for a 
specific university, strategies for the higher education sector in a region, a country or the EU – 
is up to the decision-makers. 
Futures for universities can be devised by using various starting points. One possibility is to 
take the perspective of the sector, that is, keep universities as the ‘unit of analysis’ when 
conducting a foresight process. Another one is to emphasise the importance of several driving 
forces, factors, structural, and policy variables arising from the broader systems, in which 
universities are embedded in. As already argued, this paper takes the latter approach, and thus 
first visions are devised on the EU as a whole. Then the European Research and Innovation 
Area (ERIA) is taken into account as a ‘mezzo level’ system. Finally, the most important 
trends and drivers are addressed at the level of universities.25 
These futures (“visions” or “stories of a future world”) are meant to present a number of 
different possible future roles, missions, organisational forms, strengths and weaknesses for 
universities. These visions offer a description of future states in 2020-2025 rather than “fully-
fledged” or “path scenarios”, which would develop detailed causal stories of how universities 
might be transformed between now and then. Furthermore, it is beyond the scope of this paper 
to enter into a detailed consideration of the degree of probability of specific visions. The 
modest aim is to sketch “consistent and coherent descriptions of alternative hypothetical 
futures that reflect different perspectives on past, present, and future developments, which can 
serve as a basis for action. They are tools for thinking about the future, which will be shaped 
partly through deliberate strategies and actions, partly by factors beyond the control of 
decision-makers.” [4, p. 1] In brief, visions should highlight the role of policy in realising the 
desired and feasible future. 
Futures developed in genuine foresight processes can be direct (or “positive”) inputs for 
policy preparation or strategy-building processes: once a favourable future (future state) is 
identified among the feasible ones, the path(s) leading to that specific future state can be 
designed, e.g. by using backcasting methods. More precisely, a series of actions can be 
determined, which are likely to increase the probability of achieving the desired future. 
Equally, futures developed by foresight processes can be indirect (or “negative”) inputs, a sort 
                                                 
25 Note that the national – and sub-national regional – level is “skipped” in either approach, given the huge 
diversity of the national (regional) education systems. Skipping these levels from the current exercise, however, 
does not imply that national (regional) factors can be neglected in actual prospective analyses (e.g. strategic 
planning or foresight programmes). 
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of wake up call: in case the current trends continue – because no actions are taken to change 
the course –, we arrive at such an undesirable future state. 
The major underlying assumptions for building visions for EU universities should be spelt out 
before addressing the more detailed issues, to avoid some potential misunderstanding or 
misinterpretation. First, as already stated, policies can modify – e.g. speed up, slow down or 
‘re-direct’ – the existing driving forces for change, and can trigger changes themselves, too. 
Second, universities – just as other research actors – cannot operate fully isolated from their 
socio-economic environment.26 For these two reasons, various EU polices under the label of 
the Lisbon Process, especially concerning the relative weight of competitiveness27 and 
cohesion objectives, as well as the more specific ones on the ERIA are considered here.28 
Third, the interrelations between competitiveness and cohesion can be thought of in different 
ways: (i) as mutually exclusive goals (a ‘zero-sum game’, as these policy fields are competing 
for the same set of scarce political, intellectual, organisational and financial resources); or (ii) 
as mutually reinforcing ones (a competitive, thriving EU can set aside resources to promote 
cohesion regions, while narrowing the gaps between advanced and laggard regions would 
enhance the competitiveness of the EU as a whole). This paper takes the latter view, and thus 
attributes a great significance to innovation processes in the cohesion regions/ countries, as 
well as to the wide range of policies required to promote innovation. Fourth, cohesion is an 
issue for (a) large, advanced EU member states (given the significant differences among their 
regions), (b) the four ‘classic’ cohesion countries, and (c) the 12 new member states. Thus, it 
is a major political and policy issue – and not only because of the recent enlargements, as it 
has been issue for a non-negligible part of the EU15, too, for long. Moreover, the forthcoming 
enlargement(s) would add more countries and regions to this list. Fifth, promoting RTDI 
efforts in cohesion regions via joint research projects (funded e.g. by RTD Framework 
Programmes) does not mean that scientific excellence is compromised [45]. Sixth, a 
pronounced policy emphasis on cohesion does – and should – not preclude competition 
among universities. 
 
4.1 Futures for the EU and ERIA 
The point of departure is a highly selective set of fundamental features of the EU: (i) its main 
strategic intention/ orientation in terms of putting the main emphasis on cohesion (societal 
issues) vis-à-vis competitiveness; and (ii) its overall performance compared to the other Triad 
regions.29 (Table 1) 
                                                 
26 The degree, to which they can or should be ‘protected’ from their broader context, in itself would be a subject 
of an intense discussion: different parties are likely to have rather diverse views on this question. Clearly, even a 
superficial treatment of this issue would be way beyond the scope of this paper. 
27 There is no widely accepted definition of competitiveness; economists have different views even on the 
“appropriate” level of analysis: products, firms, value chains (production networks), (sub-national) regions, 
nations, or even larger entities. This problem obviously cannot be solved here. 
28 In launching the discussion on the priorities for the new generation of cohesion policy programmes, in July 
2005 the European Commission published a draft document on “Cohesion Policy in Support of Growth and 
Jobs: Community Strategic Guidelines, 2007-2013”. [44] One of the specific guidelines is to improve the 
knowledge and innovation for growth. More specific areas of interventions include: improve and increase 
investment in RTD, facilitate innovation and promote entrepreneurship. 
29 Emerging countries, e.g. China and India, might also become important competitors, but a flexible 
interpretation of the Triad regions can easily include any relevant countries. 
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Table 1: Visions for the EU 
Internal 
strategy 
EU vs. Triad 
Cohesion (societal issues) Competitiveness (‘multi-speed EU’) 
Successful EU A) Double success: 
A carefully balanced development strategy of the EU, keeping the 
‘welfare’ elements, too, at an EU-level – but pursuing these cohesion/ 
welfare policies in a more flexible way, and using more appropriate, 
refined policy toolsa – leads to an ‘externally’ successful and cohesive 
EU.b 
B) Successful multi-speed EU 
A number of the already successful EU regions are heavily promoted by 
EU policies (funds) as ‘engines of growth’, making them even stronger, 
leading to enhanced competitiveness of the EU vis-à-vis the Triad regions. 
In the meantime, the gap between these successful EU-regions and the 
less developed ones significantly widens, even inside the big, advanced 
member states.c 
Laggard EU C) 
The EU development strategy is incapable of harmonising the 
requirements of competitiveness and cohesion; policies meant to support 
the latter are not modernised, and thus take up too many resources, and 
hamper the processes required for an enhanced competitiveness. 
Ca) Shaky cohesion: 
At least temporary achievements in terms of stronger cohesion (at the 
expense of external competitiveness, and thus being “shaky”). 
Cb) Double failure: Inappropriate strategies, insufficient co-ordination of 
various policies, poor implementation and/ or external factors lead to an 
overall failure both in terms of cohesion and performance vis-à-vis the 
other Triad regions. 
D) Failed multi-speed EU: 
A multi-speed EU strategy – in spite of ignoring cohesion – fails to close 
the gap with other Triad-regions, while it widens the gap between the 
advanced and less developed EU-regions. 
The reasons for this failure can be numerous: e.g. internal (inappropriate 
policies and/ or poor implementation), external (improving EU 
performance, but an even quicker development of the other Triad-
regions). In other words, we can regard the former case an ‘absolute’ 
failure, while the latter one a ‘relative’ failure. 
In any case, it is highly likely that key players of strong EU regions would 
act together both at an intra-regional and an inter-regional level – 
probably also with their counterparts outside of the EU. 
a The current success of Denmark, Finland and Sweden points to the possibility of a ‘reformed European socio-economic model’. [46, 47] 
b This vision requires an efficient co-ordination of a number of policies, in three ways: horizontally, i.e. across policy fields, vertically, i.e. across governance levels; and along the time dimension, too, i.e. 
short-, medium- and long-term policies also need to be harmonised. [48] The vision itself, however, makes no assumption if this co-ordination is achieved via heavy-handed top-down mechanisms, or as 
concerted actions of member states and other key players, without a strong centre. This is the well-known issue of having or not a ‘federal EU’. (See also two visions of the EUROPOLIS project, coined 
“Federal Europe”, and “Roundtable Europe”, respectively [18].) 
c Two types of EU behaviour can lead to this future state: (i) a conscious strategic choice to use available funds and other policy tools (e.g. regulation) exclusively or excessively for boosting 
competitiveness, and thus ignoring cohesion on purpose (as a perceived necessity); (ii) incapability to devise strategies and policies, and/ or general inaction, inertia, inefficiency to implement policies. (In a 
radical scenario, not to be discussed here, the loss of most/ all EU policy-making power to national, regional, and local authorities would also result in widening gaps among regions. For a largely similar 
scenario, called “Swiss Europe”, see [18].) 
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None of the above five visions can be dismissed on logical grounds, i.e. any of them can 
occur. Their likelihood (plausibility) might differ a lot, of course, but only subjective 
judgements could be made concerning the probability of these visions. In other words, we do 
not have any sound, reliable method to predict which of these visions is most likely to 
materialise. The actual relevance and use of them is to present stark choices in terms of 
strategies, and project the future repercussions of the strategic choices made now. In that way, 
these visions can inform present-day decisions, and also show the possibilities to shape our 
future. From a different angle, it is both an opportunity for, and a responsibility of, decision-
makers to act strategically. 
These different visions for the EU as a whole have strong implications for the ERIA, too. In 
principle, therefore, different types of ERIAs can be derived from the above five visions.30 In 
practice, however, not all five of them are equally relevant from a policy (strategy) point of 
view. Moreover, devising 10-15 visions for the ERIA (2-3 ERIA visions times 5 EU visions) 
would introduce an unmanageable complexity into this exercise. Thus, two cases have been 
selected to be considered when building ERIA visions: A) Double success and B) Successful 
multi-speed EU. 
What sort of ERIA would be needed to support an ‘externally’ successful, cohesive EU 
(Double success)? What sorts of policies are needed to bring about that type of ERIA (EU vs. 
national policies; STI and other policies, co-ordination of these polices)? What resources are 
needed to finance that type of ERIA? In other words, how to set in motion a virtuous circle of 
‘external’ success (competitiveness) of the EU and RTDI efforts? What are the interrelations 
between cohesion and RTDI efforts? Can we trigger a virtuous circle in this respect, too, or 
should we see it as a trade-off? The former policy approach is based on the consideration that 
Structural Funds used for promoting improved innovation capabilities can lead to faster, more 
efficient cohesion processes, and eventually enhanced external competitiveness of the EU as 
whole; that is part of the Double success vision.31 The alternative approach would favour 
using the EU funds exclusively or excessively for boosting already successful EU regions, 
which would diminish, or even ‘dry’, the Structural Funds, and that would lead to a Successful 
multi-speed EU. 
Not all of these questions can be discussed here – as appropriate answers to them would 
require a dialogue among the key players, i.e. any individual effort to come up with relevant 
replies is bound to fail almost by definition –, but the main features of the types of ERIA 
‘fitting’ to the broad visions of Double success and Successful multi-speed EU are presented 
in Table 2. 
 
                                                 
30 As already stressed, ERIA is understood throughout this paper as the set of all relevant actors of RTDI 
processes in the EU, as well as their interactions. Therefore, by making a strong link between the EU structures 
and strategies on the one hand, and the ERIA, on the other, does not deny the possibility that ‘ERIA policies’ of 
the EU can enjoy some level of independence from the overall strategy of the EU. Yet, it would go beyond the 
scope of this paper to discuss when this potential ‘discrepancy’ (or ‘mismatch’) can be seen as a ‘healthy, 
creative’ tension, i.e. ERIA policies take the lead into the ‘right’ direction, and pull other policies, too; and when 
it is ‘destructive’ by hampering development and/ or leading to waste of public resources. 
31 A closely related question is whether the emphasis put on cohesion goals would convince laggard EU 
countries/ regions to consider RTDI as an important enabler of more efficient and faster catching-up, and thus 
devote more intellectual and financial resources to it. 
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Table 2: Features of the ERIA in two EU visions: “Double success” vs. “Successful multi-speed EU” 
EU 
ERIA 
“Double success” “Successful multi-speed EU” 
Rationale for EU 
RTDI policies 
“Double-track”: tackle societal challenges, promote cohesion and 
enhance competitiveness 
Excessive emphasis on enhancing competitiveness 
Co-ordination of 
policies 
Intense and successful policy co-ordination among regions, consciously 
supported by harmonised national and EU-policies, with a specific aim 
to enhance competitiveness and advance cohesion 
‘Multi-speed’ policy co-ordination: intense and successful among 
advanced regions, supported by national and EU-policies; ad hoc and 
weak co-ordination among laggard regions, between laggard and 
advanced regions, at best with half-hearted, reluctant EU efforts 
Location of major 
HE/R centres 
Widely distributed across the EU, weaker centres are strengthened, new 
ones are set up in laggard regions with a specific objective to promote 
cohesion 
Concentrated in already strong, successful regions 
Research agenda An appropriate balance between societal and techno-economic issues Focus on techno-economic issues; some (minimal) research efforts to 
tackle social challenges stemming from the widening gaps between 
flourishing and laggard EU-regions 
Mobility of 
researchers, 
university staff 
and students 
“Two-way traffic”: gaining experience, building contacts in more 
advanced regions across the Triad, and then exploiting these contacts 
upon return to ‘cohesion’ regions via intense, mutually beneficial co-
operation 
Mobility grants explicitly aim at both nurturing talents (for excellence in 
RTDI and competitiveness) and fostering cohesion 
“One-way street”: brain-drain from laggard regions to booming ones 
Policy schemes aim at further strengthening strong regions via mobility 
grants 
“Two-way traffic” with strong Triad countries/ regions 
Integration of 
RTDI activities 
(across national 
borders) 
Widely occurring across the EU and globally; policies aimed at 
promoting the integration of RTDI activities have an explicit aim of 
fostering cohesion, too, among other EU-wide issues 
Mainly among strong, successful regions across the Triad, driven by 
businesses, supported by policies; laggards are left out for not having 
sufficient financial and intellectual resources, lacking modern 
infrastructure 
Research 
infrastructure 
Up-to-date equipment, including joint large and medium-sized RTD 
facilities, are distributed across regions, equal access to these facilities 
for all regions; EU funds earmarked for RTD infrastructure have an 
explicit aim of fostering cohesion, too 
Up-to-date equipment is concentrated in strong regions, joint large and 
medium-sized RTD facilities are hosted mainly by them, limited access 
to these facilities for laggard regions; EU funds for RTD infrastructure 
do not pursue cohesion objectives 
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Table 2: Features of the ERIA in two EU visions: “Double success” vs. “Successful multi-speed EU” (cont.) 
EU 
ERIA 
“Double success” “Successful multi-speed EU” 
Innovation 
systems, co-
operation among 
key playersa 
Strong, flexible innovation systems in a large number of regions (with 
their own specific strengths), capable of renewal and adaptation to the 
external environment, underpinning both cohesion and competitiveness 
Intense communication among businesses, academia, policy-makers, 
and the civil society to set RTDI priorities – relevant for cohesion and 
competitiveness –; strong academia-industry co-operation, mutually 
beneficial, intense links among large firms and SMEs in a large number 
of regions (gradually increasing over time) 
Co-ordinated, joint efforts – supported by EU funds – to strengthen 
weaker innovation systems, including communication, networking and 
co-operation among key players inside those regions and across regions 
Strong, flexible innovation systems in the advanced regions, capable of 
renewal and adaptation to the external environment, underpinning 
sustained competitiveness 
Intense communication among businesses, academia, and policy-makers 
to set RTDI priorities relevant for enhancing competitiveness; strong 
academia-industry co-operation, mutually beneficial, intense links 
among large firms and SMEs both inside and across flourishing regions 
Ad hoc, weak communication and co-operation among the key players 
in laggard regions; weak RTDI policy constituencies 
Insufficient, half-hearted EU-supported efforts – at best – to strengthen 
weaker innovation systems of laggard regions/ countries 
RTDI services 
(information, 
consultancy, 
incubation, etc.) 
Widely distributed across the whole EU, sharing experience across 
stronger and weaker regions, geared towards specific needs [not 
pursuing to diffuse ‘one size fits all’ type practices], supported by an 
appropriate, co-ordinated mix of regional, national and EU policies 
Mainly in the successful EU regions, sharing experience among 
themselves and with their partners Triad regions, geared towards 
specific needs, supported by an appropriate, co-ordinated mix of 
regional, national and EU policies 
Financial 
infrastructure 
Conscious EU efforts (policies, guidelines, networking, exchange of 
experience) to improve financial infrastructure across the EU 
No conscious EU efforts to improve financial infrastructure in the 
laggard regions 
Policy-preparation 
methods, practices 
Conscious EU efforts (guidelines, networking, exchange of experience) 
to improve policy-making practices across the EU 
No conscious EU efforts (guidelines, networking, exchange of 
experience) to improve policy-making practices in the laggard regions 
a Co-operation with the relevant Triad partners is taken for granted, i.e. not discussed here as a distinguishing feature 
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4.2 Futures states of universities 
Taking into account the trends and drivers identified in Sections 3, several future sates of 
universities can be elaborated, depending on the extent to which the diversity of universities – 
e.g. in terms of the composition of various roles they play, their attitudes, norms and 
strategies, as well as their performance – is taken into account. A relevant method to deal with 
diversity is to identify ideal types. To keep the discussion relatively simple and short, only 
two types of universities are considered here: 
 Universities remain largely unchanged, performing the same functions in roughly the 
same organisational attributes (allowing for efficiency improvements); 
 Universities reform themselves – or are reformed [this is not the same!!] – radically by 
transforming their main functions and/or organisational attributes. 
In other words, a sort of ‘average’ university is assumed in the following sub-sections, when 
discussing unchanged universities: not an extremely inward-looking, inflexible, ‘sclerotic’ 
one, further characterised by inertia and poor performance, and not a particularly active one in 
various networks, a flexible, dynamic, highly successful university, either – although we can 
find such universities at the extreme. Radically reformed universities, by contrast, are highly 
flexible, and thus adapt their courses, teaching and research approaches, as well as their 
organisational structures, managerial practices and other internal processes to the ever 
changing external environment, expressed by the needs of their ‘clients’: students, the wider 
research community, businesses, policy-makers and the civil society. They possess excellent 
‘navigation’ skills to find their way in this complex world, often characterised by conflicting 
requirements of the various stakeholders. 
In this logic, a third option – to emphasise the possibility for fundamentally different futures, 
and thus encourage ‘outside the box’ thinking – could be that universities disappear and their 
functions are assumed by new players, who perform their tasks/ roles in radically novel and 
diverse ways. [21] 
For an actual foresight process, aimed at assisting decision-making either at the level of 
universities, regional, national or EU (ERIA) policies, a much more refined set of ideal types 
should be developed, based on a thorough understanding of the main features of existing – 
and hypothetical future – universities. The aim of the above ‘crude’ typology is just to 
demonstrate that (a) different types of universities would act in different ways in the 
framework of the same ERIA; and (b) the same type of universities would behave differently 
– at least to some extent – when they are embedded in different socio-economic systems.32 In 
other words, this method can be understood as a sort of qualitative simulation. Thus, the 
method itself should not be judged by the choice of these simplified types of universities, 
taken as somewhat arbitrary ‘inputs’ for ‘modelling’. 
As already mentioned, visions for universities are built on alternative futures for the EU and 
ERIA, that is, Double success and Successful multi-speed EU, respectively. Tables 3-4 
identify major changes in the external environment of universities, and explore the likely 
features of unchanged and radically reformed universities under those conditions, focussing 
on their research activities.33 
 
                                                 
32 Universities, obviously, have a certain level of autonomy in choosing their strategies. 
33 Teaching activities of these two types of universities, using the same structure, are considered in [21]. 
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Table 3: Driving forces and their likely impacts on universities: “Double success” case 
Universities 
Trends, 
driving forces 
Largely unchanged universities Radically reformed universities 
The role/ 
mission of 
universities 
The main emphasis is on teaching and 
‘basic research’ (science for the sake of 
science), not much interaction with other 
players in (regional, national, sectoral, 
international) innovation systems and 
with the society 
Universities do not understand/ take on 
their role in addressing societal issues 
Increasing tensions between these 
‘traditional’ universities and the societal 
and techno-economic requirements of an 
ERIA in the Double success EU 
A new balance of the main activities; and a new 
way to conduct them: intense interactions with 
other players in (regional, national, sectoral, 
international) innovation systems and with the 
society 
New activities to promote cohesion among EU 
regions and enhance competitiveness in the 
meantime 
Universities understand the societal and techno-
economic requirements of an ERIA in the 
Double success EU, and able to adapt to this 
new environment 
Mobility of 
researchers, 
competition for 
talents 
Only a few ‘world-class’ EU universities 
can attract talents from advanced Triad 
regions 
Inside the EU, mobility is mainly a ‘one-
way street’: brain-drain prevails from 
laggard regions to booming ones, 
promoted by grants offered by 
universities located in the advanced 
regions 
Mindsets are against competition, 
measurement and evaluation – beyond 
the traditional academic indicators 
Inferior performance and a weakening 
position vis-à-vis the leading Triad 
universities 
A large(r) number of EU universities become 
attractive for talents from advanced Triad 
regions 
Universities located in advanced and laggard 
regions of the EU actively co-operate in 
promoting ‘two-way traffic’: gaining 
experience, building contacts in more advanced 
regions, and then exploiting these contacts upon 
return to ‘cohesion regions’ via intense, 
mutually beneficial co-operation 
Grants offered by universities are designed both 
to nurture talents and foster cohesion 
Diversity among universities: some of them 
focus on serving regional/ local needs, and do 
not pay attention to attract talents from other 
countries, not even from the EU 
Integration of 
RTDI activities 
(across 
national 
borders) 
Only a few ‘world-class’ EU universities 
can join global networks at the forefront 
of RTDI activities 
The majority of universities are only 
interested in ‘basic research’ projects, 
isolated from innovation processes 
Widely occurs across the EU and globally; 
policies aimed at promoting the integration of 
RTDI activities have an explicit aim of fostering 
cohesion, too 
Reformed universities actively participate in 
these co-operations 
Multi-
disciplinary 
research 
A widely used practice, but conducted in 
the rationale of ‘pure science’: the 
complexities of societal issues and 
competitiveness are not addressed; the 
full potential of multi-disciplinary 
research is not exploited 
A widely used practice at universities across the 
EU; particularly relevant for universities to play 
their societal role by better understanding the 
close relationships between societal and techno-
economic issues, as well as by offering these 
new types of insights for other actors 
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Table 4: Driving forces and their likely impacts on universities: “Successful multi-speed 
EU” 
Universities 
Trends, 
driving forces 
Largely unchanged 
universities 
Radically reformed universities 
The role/ 
mission of 
universities 
The main emphasis is on teaching 
and ‘basic research’, not much 
interaction with other players in 
innovation systems and with the 
society 
Some of the ‘elite’ universities are 
already well adapted to this 
model, putting emphasis only on 
enhancing competitiveness 
Excessive emphasis on enhancing the competitiveness 
of EU businesses; all activities serve this goal; close 
co-operation with businesses 
Mobility of 
researchers, 
competition for 
talents 
Same as in the Double success 
case  
A large(r) number of EU universities become 
attractive for talents from advanced Triad regions 
Conscious efforts on a ‘one-way street’ type mobility 
inside the EU; brain-drain from laggard regions to 
flourishing ones, promoted by grants offered by 
universities located in the advanced regions 
Integration of 
RTDI activities 
(across 
national 
borders) 
Same as in the Double success 
case, except:  
Some EU universities actively 
participate in cross-border RTDI 
activities, aimed at further 
enhancing the competitiveness of 
the advanced regions 
Mainly among strong, successful regions across the 
Triad, driven by businesses, and supported by EU 
policies; laggards are left out 
‘Elite’ universities are active partners in these 
processes, the ones located in laggard regions seek 
partners in the advanced regions (not paying attention 
to the cohesion needs of their own home region) 
Multi-
disciplinary 
research 
A more widely used practice, but 
conducted in the rationale of ‘pure 
science’: ‘cross-cutting’ issues 
relevant to enhancing 
competitiveness are not addressed; 
the complexities of societal issues 
and competitiveness are not 
addressed; the full potential of 
multi-disciplinary research is not 
exploited 
Multi-disciplinary research is pursued in a limited 
sense: mainly integrating disciplines relevant for 
tackling techno-economic (competitiveness) issues 
(i.e. somewhat neglecting societal issues) 
 
There are important driving factors, which can affect universities regardless of the logic 
followed here, that is, the alternative futures devised at EU and ERIA levels. Thus, their 
impacts should be discussed separately. As for legitimisation and validation of knowledge, 
largely unchanged universities would push hard to maintain their centuries-old monopoly to 
validate knowledge; yet, a number of other organisations – e.g. think tanks, private research 
organisations, private non-profit research organisations, government laboratories, consultancy 
firms, patient organisations, various NGOs, trade associations and interest groups – are 
increasingly produce knowledge. Four options can be envisaged for unchanged universities, 
following [28]: 
a) they progressively lose their power to validate knowledge produced outside their 
domain 
b) they maintain their power to validate knowledge produced outside their domain 
c) a new public authority is set up to validate knowledge produced by a large variety of 
actors 
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d) a clear separation of knowledge produced by universities (and other credible research 
organisations), on the one hand, and knowledge produced by other sources with a 
‘lower status’, on the other. 
Radically reformed universities would seek partnerships with other knowledge producers, as 
well as government agencies and NGOs to establish new rules – and organisations, if 
necessary – to validate knowledge jointly, and a mutually acceptable way. 
The methods, approaches, norms to organise and manage universities would also differ. At 
largely unchanged universities an overall ‘inward-looking’ (passive, ‘traditionalist’) attitude 
would prevail; albeit modern management techniques are taught, not applied for themselves; 
and evaluation of the efficiency and impacts of their activities would be perceived as a 
burden. Radically reformed universities, on the contrary, would be characterised by outward-
looking, pro-active attitudes. They would seek new partners, new funding sources, new ideas 
for their curricula and research, as well as new roles and responsibilities. They would also 
apply modern management techniques to improve performance, together with evaluation 
methods, understood as a useful tool, which would also enhance their visibility and social 
esteem.34 
 
 
5 Conclusions 
This article considered alternative futures for EU universities. Its first conclusion, however, 
concerns the present, rather than the future: several commonly used notions – and widely held 
beliefs – are out of touch with reality. For sensible future-oriented public policies and sound 
university strategies a better understanding of the current situation is needed, and, in turn, an 
appropriate terminology should be used. 
The Humboldtian model of universities – higher education and basic research as almost 
inseparable ‘Siamese twins’ – is still a prevailing notion in many professors’ and policy-
makers’ mindsets. A closer look at various R&D indicators clearly shows, however, that 
universities are not predominant research performers in the developed OECD (and EU) 
countries. Not only several other players conduct research, but in the advanced countries 
business R&D units have even a bigger weight than universities. Further, as nowadays 30-
40% of the relevant age group attend higher education courses, an ever larger number of 
higher education organisations offer mainly – or only – teaching. Meanwhile, ‘research-only’ 
positions have become widespread practice at leading universities. Thus, it is neither 
exclusively the ‘elite’, who participates in university education, and nor its only aim is to 
reproduce the academic and societal elite. Data also indicate that universities not only conduct 
basic research, and it is not only universities who conduct basic research (on average, 54% of 
basic research expenditures are spent at universities in the OECD countries). Yet, the widely 
held consensus in the literature on the rationale for funding ‘basic science’ by public money is 
still rests on the Humboldtian model: training of future generation of researchers is of 
overriding importance among the benefits of basic science, implicitly assumed to be 
conducted at universities. Given the fact that higher education and ‘basic research’ are not that 
closely interconnected as they used to be, the rationale for funding basic research needs to be 
revisited. 
To reflect on recent changes, the very notion of research has also been substantially 
broadened/ reconsidered, and new issues are now in the centre of analysis, such as knowledge, 
                                                 
34 The likely impacts of further drivers, not directly related to research activities of universities, are discussed in 
[21]. 
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knowledge production and use; learning, learning capabilities and learning systems; the role 
of new players in producing, using and validating knowledge; etc. 
As both the activities of universities and their environment are undergoing fundamental 
changes, it is timely to think systematically about their new roles, as well as to consider 
strategic issues, e.g. how to meet the new social and economic requirements; how to take 
advantage of major technological, demographic changes and opportunities stemming from 
globalisation; how to respond to intensifying and globalising competition in research and 
higher education.  
Prospective analyses can be conducted at various levels: individual universities, group of 
universities (e.g. associations of universities), regional, national or international levels. The 
main advantage of taking existing or hypothetical universities as a starting point – unit of 
analysis – is that a wealth of micro-level factors can be considered. As long as the socio-
economic system, in which a particular university operates, can be supposed to be stable, this 
approach can be satisfactory for strategy-building. 
Given the fundamental changes occurring in the surroundings of universities, it is highly 
relevant – although not a trivial task – to start this exercise by devising alternative futures 
(visions) on their broader socio-economic context. The paper has shown an example – or a 
starting point for actual policy preparation or strategy-building exercises – by considering 
different future states first for the EU and the European Research and Innovation Area, and 
then for universities themselves. In other words, a set of ‘cascading’ visions have been 
developed to demonstrate the close links between these three levels. 
This approach has a main drawback: given its complexity, it can be rather demanding, 
especially in terms of time needed for background analyses and then discussions among the 
participants. It has several advantages, too; hence, before it is being used in a real-life case, its 
costs and benefits need to be analysed. The benefits of this proposed method are discussed by 
using the example of the EU, ERIA and EU universities. 
For citizens, as well as for decision-makers in general, a main advantage can be that major 
strategic structural decisions – in our case on the overall rationale of the EU policies and on 
the ‘mission’ of the European Innovation and Research Area – are made in a transparent and 
conscious way. No doubt, the ‘small-scale’ decisions – made every day, without taking into 
account the ‘broader picture’ – would shape the EU, as well as the ERIA. This ‘muddling 
through’ might seem to be preferable for those, who do not want social dialogues on clearly 
formulated alternative strategies, given the time needed for these processes, as well as the 
potential tensions occurring while discussing the actions and their consequences. The genuine 
cost, however, can be a missed opportunity: conscious, well-articulated and broadly shared 
strategic actions might lead to a completely different, much more favourable future state, as 
opposed to the outcome of ‘muddling through’. What is striking in this respect is the sheer 
lack of alternative visions in the 2007 Green Paper on The European Research Area [3]. 
A major benefit for policy-makers (at the EU, national and regional levels) could be to 
‘simulate’ the likely impacts of their decisions, by changing the various ‘parameters’, e.g. the 
overall rationale of the EU or national policies (i.e. ‘switching’ between different EU futures), 
or the actual STI policy tools, as well as the links between STI policies, per se, and other 
policies affecting RTDI processes (that is, considering the rows in the ERIA visions, e.g. 
exploring the impacts of given polices on the mobility of researchers and students inside the 
EU or globally). As stressed in the paper, a number of drivers are global (or EU-wide) in their 
character, while decision-making competences are usually with the national or regional 
authorities. Thus, the issues of multi-level governance should be analysed, and hence the need 
for a set of structured futures, representing the various levels of governance. Further, the 
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diversity of universities can also be taken into account, provided that the appropriate ‘ideal 
types’ of universities are identified – and used as ‘input data’ for this qualitative simulation – 
for a specific policy design task. EU policy-makers might also use this structured way of 
futures-building as one of the tools assisting their initiatives to align national policies; in that 
case, however, another level needs to be introduced, namely the national one. 
For the stakeholders of universities – their leaders, staff, students, businesses, the relevant 
community around them, be it local, regional or national – a potential gain would be to obtain 
a better understanding of the context in which they operate, including the alternative future 
states, towards which these broader systems might evolve, and hence they might be better 
equipped to devise ‘future-proof’, robust strategies. In brief, they can ‘hold’ their own 
strategic parameters fixed, and juxtapose that set of features with different environments. In 
case they want to change the major features of their university, they can also explore how 
these envisaged ‘variants’ would fit into a ‘fixed’ setting. In other words, that would mean 
keeping the environment as given, and changing their university’s own characteristics. 
Finally, for disciples of innovation studies, this approach offers three advantages, as opposed 
to the case when universities are chosen as the unit of analysis: (i) the likely impacts of 
potential changes in the broader socio-economic systems, in which universities operate, can 
be analysed by devising appropriate visions for these broader systems; (ii) the observed 
diversity of higher education systems and individual universities can be reflected by 
identifying appropriate ideal types (which, in turn, can and should always be tailored to a 
specific research question); (iii) the role of other research actors, and more importantly, the 
links among universities and those other research players can be discussed properly. 
This sort of analysis – a structured set futures, taking into account the links among systems 
operating at different levels – can be of relevance in other Triad regions, too, considering their 
own salient features. It can be extended to public research organisations, too, operated either 
in the EU or other Triad regions. 
Given the importance of strategic thinking in this field, prospective activities of universities 
should be promoted by organising awareness-raising events at regional, national and 
international levels; exchanging these sorts of experience among the concerned actors is 
desirable, as are promoting strategic dialogues among the stakeholders, initiating pilot 
foresight (prospective) projects; etc. The national governments, international organisations 
and associations of universities can provide methodological and financial support for these 
initiatives. 
As for the choice among types of prospective analyses to support strategy-building for 
universities, several of them can be useful, namely those, which consider alternative futures in 
a transparent and systematic way. Foresight is among these techniques, and it offers additional 
advantages, too, and thus it is recommended to use this particular approach to underpin 
strategies for universities. By definition, foresight is a participatory process, and thus the 
accumulated knowledge and experience, as well as distinct viewpoints and approaches of the 
major stakeholders involved in these strategic dialogues, enrich the prospective discussion 
and analysis. Participation is particularly important in the case of universities: given their vital 
roles in generating, transmitting, disseminating and applying knowledge, and hence their 
contribution to socio-economic development, major stakeholders need to be involved when 
strategic decisions are to be made on universities. Further, foresight process aligns the 
participating actors around emergent agendas, resulting in a co-ordinated mobilisation of 
people, resources and actions. In other words, implementation of various policy proposals and 
strategies can be more effective, given the commitment of the participants. 
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